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Abstract 
Measured by trade in intermediate inputs, economic integration has increased between 2000 and 2014 
between members of the European Union and even more with non-members. Integration is negatively 
related to economic size and positively to the number of years as a member. Germany is the largest 
hub in the production network and the centre of gravity has moved eastward. Older member states are 
increasingly exporting service inputs and new member states primary and manufacturing inputs. 
Wages are increasing faster in countries with low initial wages, indicating wage convergence as a 
result of production integration. 
Keywords 
global value chains, economic integration, input-output models, wage convergence 
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1. Introduction* 
The European Union has succeeded in creating a common market even if some obstacles to the free 
flow of goods, services, capital and labour still remain. For a brief history and analysis of the Single 
Market and for a follow-up on subsequent measures taken to complete the Single Market, see Flam 
(1992) and Flam (2015). As shown in Flam (2015), there exists surprisingly little research on the 
amount of economic integration achieved by the Single Market. In this paper, we use tools from the 
global value chain (GVC)
 1
, spatial networks
2
 and income convergence
3
 literatures to provide a 
description of the anatomy of integration in the European Union and how integration has changed and 
intensified over time and as additional countries have joined the Union. The questions we ask are: Are 
all countries equally integrated? What is the pattern of specialization across countries? What countries 
serve as hubs or nodes in the European production network? What changes can be observed over time? 
And – as an indicator of the success of integration – have incomes converged across countries as a 
result of integration?  
Trade associated with production networks in the European Union– so-called supply-chain trade – 
makes up roughly two-thirds of trade in the Single Market.
4
 Such trade will continue to increase as 
man-made trade barriers and transportation and communication costs continue to fall. The European 
Union is a recurrent object of study in the GVC literature. For example, Timmer et.al. (2013) use GVC 
tools to analyse production fragmentation in the European Union, and Leitner and Stehrer (2014) links 
the economic performance of new member states to the participation in global value chains. As far as 
the network literature is concerned, we cannot find any studies that focus specifically on the European 
Union. However, there is a growing number of network papers that use input-output datasets to 
analyse the structure of the global trade network, many of which point to the European Union as a 
regional hub in the global economy.
5
 The network paper that is most similar to ours is Lejour et.al. 
(2017), which proposes a new method for identifying hubs in a production network by looking at the 
value-added content of the output vector of the last processing country before final demand.  
The contribution of our paper is both methodological and substantive. One methodological 
contribution is the combination of network and GVC tools, including a value-chain based definition of 
                                                     
*
 The authors gratefully acknowledge comments by Erik Dahlberg, Simon Falck and Lars Nilsson, and financial support 
from Handelsbankens forskningsstiftelser. 
1
 The GVC literature was born as a concept in 2001 [Hummels et.al. (2001) and Gereffi et.al. (2001)] and as an empirical 
field in 2007 owing to a set of new inter-country input-output datasets, including the World Input Output Database 
(WIOD), the Trade in Value Added (TiVA) dataset, and the GTAP dataset. Important contributions include 
Dietzenbacher and Romero (2007); Johnson and Noguera (2012); Antràs et.al. (2012), Los and Temurshoev (2012), 
Timmer et.al. (2013); Koopman et.al. (2014); and Los et.al. (2015). 
2
 To the best of our knowledge, the first paper that studies the global trade system from a network perspective is a 1942 
report of the League of Nations (the predecessor to the UN) entitled The World Trade Network. The report includes a 
graph (sociogram) of the structure of world trade in 1928 before the Great Depression and the outbreak of protectionist 
policies. A main point of the report was that trade is much more than the exchange of final goods – it is a network of 
supply links on which production itself rests. If the system breaks down because of ill-conceived policies, such as the 
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 that exacerbated the depression it was meant to fight, the cost to society is much larger 
than the foregone trade. The modern network analysis of trade started in the 1970´s and focused on the position and 
centrality of individual countries in the world trade network, using tools developed in sociology. The early literature 
made no distinction between intermediate and final goods since international input-output data were not available at that 
time. One of the most cited papers from the early years is Snyder and Kick´s (1979) study on the linkage between 
economic growth and the structural position of a country in the global trade network. 
3
 Baumol (1986), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Mankiw et.al. (1992). 
4
 Our calculation is based on the November 2016 edition of the World Input-Output Database (WIOD). 
5
 Cerina et.al. (2015); Amador and Cabral (2016); and Lejour et.al. (2017).  
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hubs in the input-output system. Our index is similar to the index of Lejour et.al. (2017).
6
 In addition, 
we offer a new value-chain definition of the density of the input-output system, which in the at 
network literature is defined as the share of potential links that exist. Adapted to a value chain context, 
we define the density as the share of intermediate exports of value added that is supplied directly to the 
ultimate user (as opposed to via a hub in the system). The third methodological contribution is our use 
of forward and backward integration indices to study whether supply-chain trade facilitates the 
convergence of wages at the sector level in the European Union. Our analysis builds on the research of 
Leitner and Stehrer (2014), who established a positive link between the economic performance of the 
new member states (in terms of exports, employment and productivity growth) and participation in 
global value chains (measured as the foreign value-added content of exports).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we construct a graph of the input-
output structure of the production network in the European Union. Section 3 gives a short description 
of the World Input Output Database (WIOD) that underlies our study. Section 4 presents empirical 
results on the specialization pattern and backward and forward integration of the member states into 
supply chains in the European production network, plus results on how supply chains relate to 
economic size and years of membership. Section 5 takes a network perspective and shows that 
Germany is the central hub in the European production system, with France, Italy and the United 
Kingdom as important but lesser hubs. The analysis also shows that the network has become denser - 
has more direct supply links between the member states – and has moved eastward over time as new 
member states have become more integrated. Section 6 finds that supply-chain trade causes 
convergence of wages at the sector level across countries. Section 7 concludes.  
  
                                                     
6
 Our measure is a GVC adaptation of the so-called betweenness centrality index used in the network literature. The 
derivation is different from Lejour et.al. (2017) but the indices are similar.  
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2. A first look at European Union integration 
 
Let us first look at in Figure 1 which is a map of the European Union production network. The input-
output data used to construct the map are taken from the November 2016 edition of the World Input-
Output Database (WIOD) described in section 3. Arrows show gross flows of primary (green), 
manufactured (blue) and services inputs (red) between the member states in 2014. For clarity we only 
include bilateral trade worth more than 100 million USD. (The WIOD database is denominated in 
USD). Arrows between member states are colour coded and divided into 100 steps using a logarithmic 
scale. More intense colours signify larger trade flows. 
Figure 1. Gross flows of primary, manufactured and services inputs in 2014 between EU 
countries worth more than 100 million USD 
 
As one may expect, trade in intermediate inputs in absolute terms is most intensive between the largest 
economies in the European Union and Germany is the central hub in the production network. The 
supply-chain trade is particularly intensive in the triangle formed by Germany, France, and the 
Benelux countries, all of which are original members of the EU. Colours show the basic pattern of 
specialization. The old member states trade relatively more services and the new member states 
relatively more primary and manufactured inputs, with the exception of Cyprus and Malta that 
specialize in services.  
Håkan Nordström and Harry Flam 
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3. Data 
Our data are from the November 2016 edition of WIOD, which was put together by a research group 
coordinated by members of the Economics and Business faculty of University of Groningen, 
Netherlands. WIOD is constructed from national IO-tables and bilateral trade data and covers all 
current member states and 15 key trading partners to the European Union listed in Table 1. The rest of 
the world (RoW) is aggregated into one region that is calibrated to balance the global accounts. WIOD 
contains data for 56 sectors divided into 4 primary, 19 manufacturing and 33 services sectors listed in 
Table 2. Annual data are available from 2000 to 2014.
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Table 1. Country coverage of WIOD 2016 
EU members Year of entry Other countries Region 
Belgium (BEL) 1958, Euro (1999) Norway (NOR) Europe 
France (FRA) 1958, Euro (1999) Switzerland (CHE) Europe 
Germany (DEU) 1958, Euro (1999) Turkey (TUR) Near East 
Italy (ITA) 1958, Euro (1999) Russian Federation (RUS) Europe/Asia  
Luxembourg (LUX) 1958, Euro (1999) Brazil (BRA) Americas 
Netherlands (NLD) 1958, Euro (1999) Canada (CAN) Americas 
Ireland (IRL) 1973, Euro (1999) Mexico (MEX) Americas 
Denmark (DNK) 1973 United States (USA) Americas 
United Kingdom (GBR) 1973 China (CHN) Asia 
Greece (GRC) 1981, Euro (2001) Chinese Taipei (TWN) Asia 
Portugal (PRT) 1986, Euro (1999) India (IND) Asia 
Spain (ESP) 1986, Euro (1999) Indonesia (IDN) Asia 
Austria (AUT) 1995, Euro (1999) Japan (JPN) Asia 
Finland (FIN) 1995, Euro (1999) Korea (KOR) Asia 
Sweden (SWE) 1995 Australia (AUS) Oceania 
Slovenia (SVN) 2004, Euro (2007)   
Cyprus (CYP) 2004, Euro (2008) Rest of World (ROW)  
Malta (MLT) 2004, Euro (2008)   
Slovak Republic (SVK) 2004, Euro (2009)   
Estonia (EST) 2004, Euro (2011)   
Latvia (LVA) 2004, Euro (2014)   
Lithuania (LTU) 2004, Euro (2015)   
Czech Republic (CZE) 2004   
Hungary (HUN) 2004   
Poland (POL) 2004   
Bulgaria (BGR) 2007   
Romania (ROU) 2007   
Croatia (HRV) 2013   
    
 
  
                                                     
7
 See Dietzenbacher et.al. (2013), Timmer et.al. (2015), and Timmer et.al. (2016) for details on how WIOD is constructed 
and can be used.  
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Table 2. Sector coverage of WIOD 2016 
ISIC Rev. 4 Sector Aggregate 
Primary production  
  A01 Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities PP 
  A02 Forestry and logging PP 
  A03 Fishing and aquaculture PP 
  B Mining and quarrying PP 
Manufacturing  
  C10-C12 Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco products RBM 
  C13-C15 Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel and leather products RBM 
  C16 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; … RBM 
  C17 Manufacture of paper and paper products RBM 
  C18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media RBM 
  C19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products RBM 
  C20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products RBM 
  C21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations RBM 
  C22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products RBM 
  C23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products RBM 
  C24 Manufacture of basic metals RBM 
  C25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment RBM 
  C26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products CE 
  C27 Manufacture of electrical equipment CE 
  C28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. MVTO 
  C29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers MVTO 
  C30 Manufacture of other transport equipment MVTO 
  C31-C32 Manufacture of furniture; other manufacturing MVTO 
  C33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment MVTO 
Services  
  D35 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply OS 
  E36 Water collection, treatment and supply OS 
  E37-E39 Sewerage; waste collection, treatment and disposal; materials recovery; … OS 
  F Construction OS 
  G45 Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles OS 
  G46 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles OS 
  G47 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles OS 
  H49 Land transport and transport via pipelines TS 
  H50 Water transport TS 
  H51 Air transport TS 
  H52 Warehousing and support activities for transportation TS 
  H53 Postal and courier activities TS 
  I Accommodation and food service activities OS 
  J58 Publishing activities BS 
  J59-J60 Motion picture, video and tv production, sound recording and music publishing, …  BS 
  J61 Telecommunications BS 
  J62-J63 Computer programming, consultancy; information service activities BS 
  K64 Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding FI 
  K65 Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security FI 
  K66 Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities FI 
  L68 Real estate activities BS 
  M69-M70 Legal and accounting activities; head offices; management consultancy activities BS 
  M71 Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis BS 
  M72 Scientific research and development BS 
  M73 Advertising and market research BS 
  M74-M75 Other professional, scientific and technical activities; veterinary activities BS 
  N Administrative and support service activities BS 
  O84 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security OS 
  P85 Education OS 
  Q Human health and social work activities OS 
  R-S Other service activities OS 
  T Activities of households as employers …  OS 
  U Activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies OS 
   PP = Primary products; RBM = Resource based manufacturing; CE = Computer and electronic equipment; 
MVTO = Machinery, veichles, transport equipment and other manufacturing; TS = Transportation services;  
FI = Finance and insurance; BS = Business services; OS = Other services. 
Håkan Nordström and Harry Flam 
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4. The pattern of trade in intermediate inputs 
As a preliminary step, we need to describe the structure of a closed economy input-output model and 
then of the multi-country input-output model of WIOD.  
4.1 Closed economy input-output model 
The input-output table of a closed economy is depicted in Table 3. The first n n elements of the 
input-output table record intra- and inter-industry flows of intermediate goods and services, where 
sales from sector i to j are recorded horizontally and purchases by sector j from sector i vertically. The 
n+1 column (“Final demand”) records sales to final consumers and the n+1 row (“Value added”) 
outlays on labour and capital used to process intermediate inputs into next-stage (“downstream”) 
inputs in the value-chain. The right-most column reports total output (supply) by industry and the 
bottom row total input (use) by industry, which in equilibrium are equal in monetary terms. 
Table 3. Input-output table of a closed economy 
               Using sector j = 1, 2, …, n   
                  
  Intermediate demand Final Total 
  Sector 1 Sector 2 ⋯ Sector n demand output 
 Sector 1 z11 z12 ⋯ z1n f1 y1 
Supplying sector Sector 2 z21 z22 ⋯ z2n f2 y2 
i =1, 2 ,… , n ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋱ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ 
 Sector n zn1 zn2 ⋯ znn fn yn 
 Value added w1 w2 ⋯ wn   
 Total input y1 y2 ⋯ yn   
The production side of this Leontief model is the simplest possible, with fixed input coefficients and 
constant returns to scale (CRS),  
 
(1)    𝑦𝑖 = min(
𝑧1i
𝑎1i
,
𝑧2i
𝑎2i
, … ,
𝑧𝑛𝑖
𝑎𝑛𝑖
;  
𝑤𝑖
𝑏𝑖
)  , 
where 𝑦𝑖 denotes the output of sector i, 𝑧𝑗𝑖 inputs from sector j and  𝑤𝑖 inputs of primary production 
factors (which in equilibrium equals 1−∑𝑎𝑖𝑗 under the CRS assumption). As there is no 
substitutability between different types of inputs in the Leontief model, firms will employ just the 
minimum amount of inputs to produce the output demanded by the market,  
 
(2)     𝑧𝑖𝑗 = 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑗. 
The model is closed by treating final demand as an exogenous vector. Under these assumptions, the 
model boils down to a linear equation system of supply and demand, 
 
(3)      [
𝑦1
𝑦2
⋮
𝑦𝑛
]
⏟
𝒚
= [
𝑎11 𝑎12 ⋯ 𝑎1𝑛
𝑎21 𝑎22 … 𝑎2𝑛
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑎𝑛1 𝑎𝑛2 ⋯ 𝑎𝑛𝑛
]
⏟              
𝑨
[
𝑦1
𝑦2
⋮
𝑦𝑛
]
⏟
𝒚
+ [
𝑓1
𝑓2
⋮
𝑓𝑛
]
⏟
𝒇
.
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where 𝒚 denotes the production vector, 𝑨 the input-output matrix per unit of output and 𝒇 the final 
demand vector. The equation system has the following solution (general equilibrium),  
(4)         𝒚 = [𝑰 − 𝑨]−𝟏𝒇,  
    
where [𝑰 − 𝑨]−𝟏 is the so-called Leontief inverse that computes total input requirement from each 
sector to produce the final demand vector.  
4.2 Multi-country input-output model 
Extending the Leontief model into a multi-country input-output model is a matter of scaling up the 
model, since the world as a whole is a closed economy. Using block-matrix notation, the multi-country 
version of the Leontief model takes the form 
 
 
(5)         
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝒚𝟏
𝒚𝟐
⋮
𝒚𝟐𝟖
—
𝒚𝟐𝟗
𝒚𝟑𝟎
⋮
𝒚𝟒𝟒]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
⏟  
𝒚
=
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑨𝟏,𝟏 𝑨𝟏,𝟐⋯𝑨𝟏,𝟐𝟖 
𝑨𝟐,𝟏 𝑨𝟐,𝟐⋯𝑨𝟐,𝟐𝟖 
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑨𝟐𝟖,𝟏 𝑨𝟐𝟖,𝟐⋯𝑨𝟐𝟖,𝟐𝟖 
ǀ
ǀ
ǀ
ǀ
𝑨𝟏,𝟐𝟗 𝑨𝟏,𝟑𝟎⋯𝑨𝟏,𝟒𝟒
𝑨𝟐,𝟐𝟗 𝑨𝟐,𝟑𝟎⋯𝑨𝟐,𝟒𝟒
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
 𝑨𝟐𝟖,𝟐𝟗 𝑨𝟐𝟖,𝟑𝟎⋯𝑨𝟐𝟖,𝟒𝟒
 ————— — ǀ ————— —   
𝑨𝟐𝟗,𝟏𝑨𝟐𝟗,𝟐⋯𝑨𝟐𝟗,𝟐𝟖 
𝑨𝟑𝟎,𝟏 𝑨𝟑𝟎,𝟐⋯𝑨𝟑𝟎,𝟐𝟖 
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑨𝟒𝟒,𝟏𝑨𝟒𝟒,𝟐⋯𝑨𝟒𝟒,𝟐𝟖  
ǀ
ǀ
ǀ
ǀ
𝑨𝟐𝟗,𝟐𝟗 𝑨𝟐𝟗,𝟑𝟎⋯𝑨𝟐𝟗,𝟒𝟒
𝑨𝟑𝟎,𝟐𝟗𝑨𝟑𝟎,𝟑𝟎⋯𝑨𝟑𝟎,𝟒𝟒
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑨𝟒𝟒,𝟐𝟗𝑨𝟒𝟒,𝟑𝟎⋯𝑨𝟒𝟒,𝟒𝟒]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
⏟                          
𝑨
 
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝒚𝟏
𝒚𝟐
⋮
𝒚𝟐𝟖
—
𝒚𝟐𝟗
𝒚𝟑𝟎
⋮
𝒚𝟒𝟒]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
⏟  
𝒚
+
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
∑𝑗𝒇𝟏,𝒋
∑𝑗𝒇𝟐,𝒋
⋮
∑𝑗𝒇𝟐𝟖,𝒋
———
∑𝑗𝒇𝟐𝟗,𝒋
∑𝑗𝒇𝟑𝟎,𝒋
⋮
∑𝑗𝒇𝟒𝟒,𝒋 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
⏟    
𝒇
  
 
where 𝒚𝒊 is the output vector of country i; 𝑨𝒊𝒋 is the input-output block between country i and j; and 
∑𝑗𝒇𝒊𝒋 is the global demand vector for the final products of country i. The dashed lines in (5) mark the 
division between the European Union and the rest of the world. 
The global input-output model can be expressed in compact form as a two-region model with the 
European Union as one region (subscript 𝒆) and the rest of the world as the other region (subscript 𝒘),  
 
(6)     [
𝒚𝒆
𝒚𝒘
]
⏟
𝒚
= [
𝑨𝒆𝒆 𝑨𝒆𝒘
𝑨𝒘𝒆 𝑨𝒘𝒘
]
⏟        
𝑨
[
𝒚𝒆
𝒚𝒘
]
⏟
𝒚
+ [
𝒇𝒆
𝒇𝒘
]
⏟
𝒇
 , 
where 𝑨𝒆𝒆 records input-output linkages within the European Union, 𝑨𝒆𝒘 forward (downstream) 
linkages to the rest of the world, and 𝑨𝒘𝒆  backward (upstream) linkages to the rest of the world. The 
general equilibrium of the world economy can be solved as a function of the four blocks of 𝑨 through 
block inversion,  
 
(7)      [
𝒚𝒆
𝒚𝒘
]
⏟
𝒚
= [
(𝑰 − 𝑨𝒆𝒆 − 𝑹𝒆𝒘𝒆)
−𝟏 (𝑰 − 𝑨𝒆𝒆 − 𝑹𝒆𝒘𝒆)
−𝟏𝑨𝒆𝒘(𝑰 − 𝑨𝒘𝒘)
−𝟏
(𝑰 − 𝑨𝒘𝒘−𝑹𝒘𝒆𝒘)
−𝟏𝑨𝒘𝒆(𝑰 − 𝑨𝒆𝒆)
−𝟏 (𝑰 − 𝑨𝒘𝒘 −𝑹𝒘𝒆𝒘)
−𝟏 ]⏟                                                  
[𝑰−𝑨]−𝟏
[
𝒇𝒆
𝒇𝒘
]
⏟
 
𝒇
, 
where 𝑹𝒆𝒘𝒆  ≡ 𝑨𝒆𝒘[𝑰 − 𝑨𝒘𝒘]
−𝟏𝑨𝒘𝒆 and 𝑹𝒘𝒆𝒘 ≡ 𝑨𝒘𝒆[𝑰 − 𝑨𝒆𝒆]
−𝟏𝑨𝒆𝒘 measure the circular flows of 
inputs between the regions (known as “returning value added” in the GVC literature). The upper left 
block of the global Leontief inverse measures the supply-chain trade within the European Union 
(including returning inputs that re-enter the supply chains after a processing stage outside the 
European Union), the upper right block the sales of inputs to the rest of the world and the lower left 
block the purchases of inputs.  
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4.3 Supply-chain decomposition 
To analyse the supply chains we need additional tools that can split them into their country 
components, or specifically, to split total value added into country contributions. In this context we 
may call supply chains value added chains (the two concepts are used interchangeably in the 
literature). The decomposition of value added can either be done by following the value chains 
forward (downstream) from each sector to the final demand vector, or backward (upstream) from each 
sector to the different tiers of suppliers and sub-suppliers. We will use the backward decomposition 
technique, as illustrated in Figure 3. 
The backward decomposition technique introduced by Mirodout and Nordström (2015) starts with 
the accounting identity 
 
(8)       𝒊 = 𝑨′𝒊 + 𝒗,  
where 𝒊 is a unit vector of output, 𝑨′𝒊 is the cost share of non-primary inputs (using primes to denote 
the transpose of matrix or vector) and 𝒗 the value-added share, i.e. the compensation received by the 
primary factors of production, labour and capital, per unit of output. By iterating the accounting 
identity backward in the supply chain (that is, replacing the 𝒊 on the right hand side with 𝑨′𝒊 + 𝒗) we 
get an infinite series that decomposes the value-added by stage of production:  
 
(9)        𝒊 = 𝒗⏟
𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍
𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒍𝒚
+ 𝑨′𝒗⏟
𝟏:𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒓
𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒓𝒔
+ 𝑨′𝟐𝒗⏟
𝟐:𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒓
𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒓𝒔
+⋯ = 𝒗⏟
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑦
+ 𝑨′[𝑰 − 𝑨′]−𝟏 𝒗⏟        
𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠
 .
 
  
Figure 3. Supply chain decomposition (per unit of output) 
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The share of an individual country is found by setting all coefficients to zero in the 𝒗-vector except for 
the country under consideration. These calculations can be done for one country at the time or in one 
computational step by redefining 𝒗 as a block-diagonal matrix, 
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(10)    𝑽 = 𝑏𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝒗) + 𝑨′[𝑰 − 𝑨′]−𝟏𝑏𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝒗) 
           = [
𝐯𝟏 𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎
𝟎 𝐯𝟐 … 𝟎
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝟎 𝟎 ⋯ 𝐯𝐦
]
⏟            
value added
final assembly
+
[
 
 
 
〈𝐀′[𝐈 − 𝐀′]−𝟏〉𝟏𝐯𝟏 〈𝐀′[𝐈 − 𝐀′]
−𝟏〉𝟏𝐯𝟐 ⋯ 〈𝐀′[𝐈 − 𝐀′]
−𝟏〉𝟏𝐯𝐦
〈𝐀′[𝐈 − 𝐀′]−𝟏〉𝟐𝐯𝟏 〈𝐀′[𝐈 − 𝐀′]
−𝟏〉𝟐𝐯𝟐 … 〈𝐀′[𝐈 − 𝐀′]
−𝟏〉𝟐𝐯𝐦
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
〈𝐀′[𝐈 − 𝐀′]−𝟏〉𝐦𝐯𝟏 〈𝐀′[𝐈 − 𝐀′]
−𝟏〉𝐦𝐯𝟐 ⋯ 〈𝐀′[𝐈 − 𝐀′]
−𝟏〉𝐦𝐯𝐦]
 
 
 
⏟                                          
upstream valued added 
 by country (c=1,2,…,m)
 . 
The 𝑽-matrix provides a full decomposition of the contribution of each country (c = 1, 2, …, m) per 
unit of output in all value chains defined by the database, where the domestic shares (divided between 
final assembly and upstream production) are recorded on the diagonal blocks and the foreign shares by 
country on the off-diagonal blocks. The decomposition can be done by country and sector by simply 
exchanging the block-diagonal matrix of 𝒗 for a diagonal matrix, thereby expanding that dimension of 
𝑽 from (country × sector) × country to (country × sector) × (country × sector). 
4.4 Slicing the value chain  
How much of the value added in the output of the European Union can be attributed to domestic inputs 
of the member states (referred to as domestic value added); how much can be attributed to inputs 
produced in other member states (referred to as EU value added); and how much can be attributed to 
inputs produced outside the European Union (referred to as non-EU value added)? We are interested 
both in the differences between primary production, manufacturing and services (Table 1) and the 
evolution over time.  
Figure 4. Foreign value added in primary production, manufacturing and services 
Weighted averages of all member states. 
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Source: Own calculations based on the Novermber 2016 edition of WIOD. 
As one may expect, manufacturing uses more imported inputs from EU and non-EU countries than the 
primary sector, which in turn uses more imported inputs than the services sector. The manufacturing 
sector is by this measure more integrated into regional and global value chains than the other sectors. 
The division between EU and non-EU inputs is roughly fifty-fifty in all sectors, measured in value 
added. The imported share of value added is increasing over time and somewhat faster for non-EU 
inputs than EU inputs. Thus, there is no evidence that the European Union is closing its gates towards 
the outside world.
8
  
Now, since the shares of both EU and non-EU inputs have increased over time, the domestic value-
added shares must have fallen, albeit from a high level. The domestic share in primary production has 
fallen from 85.9 percent in 2000 to 79.2 percent in 2014; in manufacturing from 73.6 percent to 64.8 
percent; and in services from 89.6 percent to 86.9 percent. Is that bad news? Presumably, this has 
contributed to lower costs and/or increased quality. 
4.5 Degrees of backward and forward integration  
Are all member states equally integrated in the supply chains in the European Union? To answer this 
question, we need metrics of integration. It may be helpful to recall Figure 1 at this point, which maps 
the flows of intermediate inputs between the member states. Arrows that point to a country indicate 
purchases of inputs and arrows that point from a country indicate sales of inputs. We refer to the 
former as backward and the latter as forward integration. The backward integration is calculated by 
summing the upstream value added over all member states in equation (10), apart from the domestic 
blocks on the diagonal. The forward integration can also be calculated in a roundabout way using 
equation (10). For example, to calculate the forward integration of Sweden, we could use equation 
(10) to calculate how much value added from Sweden that the other member states use in their 
production. However, we will derive a direct metric by following the supply chains forward through 
the input-output system to the final demand vector and measure how much value added that is routed 
                                                     
8
 The European Union has concluded bilateral free trade agreements with some 25 countries since 2000: Albania, Algeria, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia and Peru, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Macedonia, Georgia, Ghana, Israel, 
Jordan, Korea, Lebanon, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, Papua New Guinea and Fiji, Moldova, San Marino, Serbia and 
South Africa. (Source: WTO Regional Trade Agreement database). 
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from each member state through each of the other member states. This metric will also be used in 
section 5 to identify hubs in the input-output system. 
We first ask how much value added that is exported via each individual member state j = {1,2, …, 
28} and then sum the results. To isolate the production stages in country j we use an ancillary matrix 
with zero coefficients in all positions of 𝑨 but for the columns of j, denoted 𝑨𝒋. The value added 
exported through country j to the world market (as inputs in country j´s export of final products) is 
given by the following formula, 
 
(11)     𝒗𝒂𝒙_𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒋 = 𝑣 ∙ {𝑨𝒋𝑓 + 𝑨𝑨𝒋𝑓 + 𝑨
𝟐𝑨𝒋𝑓 + 𝑨
𝟑𝑨𝒋𝑓 +⋯} = 𝑣 ∙ {[𝑰 − 𝑨]
−𝟏𝑨𝒋𝑓} , 
where 𝑣 is the value added vector and where the operator · denotes the Hadamard product (element-
by-element multiplication). Note that (11) accounts for all paths in the global input-output system that 
passes through country j either directly or indirectly after processing in other countries, including 
countries outside the EU. Summing over all member states except for the exporting country we get a 
measure of the forward integration within the European Union, normalized with the GDP (total value 
added) of the exporting country. Since the forward integration index measures the share of the national 
value added that is embodied as inputs in the output vector of the other member states, it is the mirror 
image of the backward integration index that measures the value added of the other member states 
embodied in the national output vector. 
Figure 5 plots the backward and forward integration of the member states in 2000 and 2014 against 
the size of each economy measured by the logarithm of its GDP. The old member states (EU15) are 
indicated by blue circles and the new member states by orange circles. The correlation is negative in 
both directions. That is, smaller member states both buy and sell proportionally more inputs than 
larger member states as a share of GDP and are in this sense more integrated in the supply chains of 
the European Union, but with large differences between member states. 
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Figure 5. Integration into EU value chains 
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Figure 6. Integration into non-EU value chains 
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Figure 6 plots the backward and forward integration with the rest of the world. The correlation with 
the size of the economy is also in this case negative backwards and forwards in the supply chains. The 
general conclusion is that small economies tend to be more integrated as a share of GDP into both EU 
and non-EU value chains compared to large economies. This is natural since small countries cannot 
produce as many inputs as large countries without forgoing economies of scale in production. 
Furthermore, supply-chain trade may be particularly advantageous for small economies since it offers 
an opportunity to trade indirectly with the world through centrally located hubs (see Section 5). 
Table 4. Determinants of the backward and forward integration 
of the member states into EU and non-EU value chains 
 Backward 
 EU 
Forward 
EU 
Backward 
non-EU 
Forward 
non-EU 
     Ln(GDP) -3.37*** -1.92*** -2.43*** -1.96*** 
 (0.20) (0.16) (0.13) (0.12) 
     EU member (1/0) 3.28*** 3.33*** 0.06 1.30*** 
 (0.84) (0.67) (0.56) (0.50) 
     EU member years 0.15*** 0.08*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
     Obs            420            420            420            420 
R2 0.43 0.30 0.51 0.49 
Note: The regressions only include the member states of the EU and cover the period 2000-2014. 
Yearly fixed effects are included to control for business cycle and trends in the data. 
*, **, *** indicate the significance level of the estimated countries (10%, 5% and 1%).  
Apart from economic size, integration in the European Union also depends on how long a country has 
been a member. This is shown in Table 4. The integration impact of becoming a member of the EU is 
measured by a dummy variable that is zero in the years before accession and one after the accession 
plus the number years a country has been a member, a continuous variable. The estimated coefficients 
show that backward and forward integration is on average 3.28 and 3.33 percentage points higher 
respectively for European Union members than for the candidate member countries in any given year, 
and that backward and forward integration into the supply chains increases by 0.15 and 0.08 
percentage points annually after accession to the European Union. 
For completeness, we also run regressions on the integration into non-EU value chains. We are 
particularly interested in whether accession to the European Union reduces integration into non-EU 
value chains. As shown in the last two columns of Table 4, there is no evidence of a substitution 
effect. On the contrary, the relationship seems to be complementary. That is, acceding countries do not 
only increase their integration in EU value chains over time but also in non-EU value chains. This 
somewhat surprising result can be explained by the benefits offered by access to the European Union´s 
network of free trade agreements, productivity improvements (see section 6), and indirect exports of 
inputs to the world market through well-connected hubs in the EU (see section 5).  
4.6 Division of labour in the European Union 
We close this section by analysing the division of labour in the European Union. For reasons of space 
limitation, we divide the 56 sectors in WIOD into 8 groups of inputs defined in Table 2: Primary 
products; Resource-based manufactured inputs; Computer and electronic equipment; Machinery, 
vehicles, transport equipment and other manufactured inputs; Transportation services; Finance and 
insurance; Business services; and Other services. The specialization pattern is evaluated by comparing 
supply shares of each member state with weighted averages of all member states (marked by the zero 
lines in Figure 7). 
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Figure 7. Division of labour in the European Union 
Deviations from weighted averages measured in percentage points  
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Figure 7. Division of labour in European Union D 
Deviations from the weighted averages measured in percentage points 
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The first plot in Figure 7 shows that Denmark, Bulgaria, Netherlands, Latvia and Croatia are relatively 
large suppliers of primary inputs in relative – not absolute – terms. The second plot shows that 
Lithuania, Portugal, Slovenia and Finland are relatively large suppliers of resourced-based 
manufactured inputs; the third plot that Germany, Czech Republic, Romania, Estonia and Austria are 
relatively large suppliers of computers and electronic equipment; and the forth plot shows that 
Hungary, Czech Republic, Germany, Slovakia, Austria and Italy are relatively large suppliers of 
machinery, vehicles, transport equipment and other manufactured inputs. In services, Cyprus, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Greece, Malta and Estonia are relatively strong in transportation services; 
Luxembourg, Malta, Cyprus, Ireland and United Kingdom in financial and insurance services; Malta, 
United Kingdom, Ireland, Luxembourg and France in business services; and Poland, Netherlands, 
Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania in Other services, which includes utilities, construction, wholesale and 
retail and public services. The latter services are exported indirectly as inputs in the export vector of 
other intermediate products. Countries that are not mentioned above have supply patterns that are 
close to the averages.  
Finally, if we compare old and new member states, old member states specialize more in services 
and new member states in primary products and manufactures, with the exception of Cyprus and Malta 
that are services economies (Table 5). It is noteworthy that services – business services in particular – 
is the fastest growing category of inputs.
9
 
Table 5. Average composition of inputs of old and new member states to all member 
states 
Per cent.  
 2000 2014 
Category of inputs Old New Old New 
Primary products 5.1 9.0 5.0 7.1 
     Manufactures 44.1 47.3 36.4 40.5 
   Resource based manufacturing  28.4 30.8 23.0 24.4 
   Computer and electronic equipment 6.5 5.6 4.7 4.9 
   Machinery, vehicles, transport equipment and other manufacturing 9.2 10.9 8.7 11.2 
     Services 50.9 43.8 58.7 52.3 
   Transportation services 6.9 7.5 7.2 9.8 
   Finance and insurance 4.3 2.6 5.3 2.8 
   Business services 21.4 12.8 25.8 15.7 
   Other services 18.3 20.9 20.4 24.0 
Note: The shares do not sum to 100 because of rounding errors. 
 
  
                                                     
9
 On this point, see further National Board of Trade (2016). 
Håkan Nordström and Harry Flam 
18 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
5. The geography of the European Union production network  
Network analysis – so-called graph theory in mathematics – is used in many academic disciplines to 
visualize and analyse systems composed of individual parts that are linked together in some way.
10
 
When the object is a social network – such as a Facebook group or an academic network – the 
adjective social is used to indicate both the nature of the network and the tools that are used, many of 
which were developed in sociology. Central in social network analysis is the “position” and 
“centrality” of individual members (countries in our case) and the advantage or disadvantage of a 
given position.  
First, we are interested in the existence of hubs in the production network. To identify hubs we 
construct an index by calculating how much value added that is exported through country 𝑗 from each 
member state, using formula (11), and dividing the result by the country´s total exports of intermediate 
inputs multiplied by 100. The pass-through or hub index ranges from 0 to 100 percent, where the 
upper limit indicates that all exports of intermediate inputs are inputs that pass through the hubs with 
no direct trade in intermediate inputs between the countries concerned. The maximum index value that 
we observe in the data is 27.6 percent (from the Czech Republic through Germany). The pass-through 
index is related to the so-called betweenness centrality index used in the network literature, which 
measures the importance of individual nodes as so-called bridges to other nodes in the system.
11
 Our 
hub index is similar to the hub index derived independently by Lejour et.al. (2017). 
The threshold for being a hub is a matter of judgment. It depends both on the index value and on 
the absolute value of traded inputs. For the latter criterion to be fulfilled, a relatively large number of 
significant trade flows from other countries must pass through the country that is a hub. Figure 8 maps 
all intermediate bilateral sectoral trade flows that make up at least 5 percent of the intermediate 
exports of a member state. Somewhat arbitrarily, we define hubs as those countries that receive many 
incoming and outgoing arrows.  
It is clear from the map that Germany is the central hub, especially for the new member states in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Up to one quarter of the exports of intermediate inputs of Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary pass through Germany. The other three major economies in 
the European Union – France, United Kingdom and Italy – are also important hubs, but for a smaller 
number of countries. Even mid-size countries such as Sweden, Netherlands and Belgium are hubs for 
some neighbouring countries. For example, the largest hub for Estonia is not Germany but Sweden 
and Finland, suggesting a local cluster of supply links in the north-east corner of the European Union. 
  
                                                     
10
 For a general introduction to network analysis, see Newman (2010). For applications to trade networks, see Snyder and 
Kick (1979), Smith and White (1992), Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1994), De Benedictis and Tajoli (2011), De Benedictis 
et.al. (2013), Cerina et.al. (2015) and Lejour et.al. (2017). 
11
 See Newman (2010) for the mathematical definition of betweenness centrality.  
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Figure 8. Geography of the European Union production network: 
2000  
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2014 
 
 
If we compare the maps for 2000 and 2014 it seems at first sight that Germany has strengthened its 
hub position in the network. But the map is somewhat misleading, since it only includes trade flows 
above the 5 percent threshold. All hubs have in fact lost some ground, including Germany, as is 
evident from Table 6. The losses have mainly been to countries outside the European Union and to 
China in particular. For example, the share of all intermediate value-added exports in the European 
Union passing through Germany (not counting domestic value added) has fallen from 10.3 percent in 
in 2000 to 9.4 percent in 2014, whereas it has increased for Poland from 1.4 to 1.9 per cent. For the 
European Union as a whole, the vale added that passes through all hubs has decreased from 53.0 
percent in 2000 to 49.4 percent in 2014, with a corresponding increase for hubs outside. The most 
important hub outside the European Union is the United States with a share of 8.4 percent in 2014 that 
is decreasing. China is at the same time becoming a more important hub, up from 1.8 percent in 2000 
to 5.4 percent in 2014. 
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Table 6. The top ten hubs in the European Union 
Share of intermediate exports of value added through each hub, percent 
per                                2000                               2014 
Total EU 53.0 49.4 
Germany 10.3 9.4 
France 7.9 6.6 
United Kingdom 6.1 5.4 
Italy 5.3 4.3 
Spain 4.8 2.9 
Netherlands 3.0 2.3 
Belgium 2.9 2.5 
Sweden 2.0 1.5 
Austria 1.7 1.7 
Poland 1.4 1.9 
Denmark 1.3 1.3 
 
Table 7 below lists the top three hubs for each member state. Germany is on the top three list of all 
member states except Cyprus and Malta in 2014, which once again is a strong indication that Germany 
is the central hub in the European production network. Germany is particularly important as a hub for 
Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. France is on the top three list of 13 member 
states in 2000 and 14 in 2014; United Kingdom for 13 member states in 2000 and 15 in 2014; Italy for 
11 member states in 2000 and 12 in 2014; and Spain for 3 member states in 2000 and 2 in 2014. A 
handful other member states are also on the top three list for a neighbouring country, such as the 
Czech Republic for Slovakia and Finland and Sweden for Estonia.  
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Table 7. Top three hubs of each member state  
Share of intermediate exports of value added through each hub, percent 
 2000 2014 
 1st 2
nd
 3rd 1st 2nd 3
rd
 
Austria DEU (25.2) ITA (8.2) GBR (5.5) DEU (23.2) ITA (6.4) FRA (4.6) 
Belgium DEU (16.5) FRA (13.9) NLD (7.4) DEU (12.2) FRA (10.7) GBR (6.6) 
Bulgaria ITA (7.3) DEU (6.9) FRA (3.4) DEU (7.9) ITA (5.3) FRA (4.0) 
Croatia ITA (7.8) DEU (6.1) SVN (4.3) ITA (8.5) DEU (8.3) AUT (4.3) 
Cyprus NLD (10.7) GBR (5.9) GRC (5.8) MLT (6.9) GBR (5.5) ITA (3.7) 
Czech Republic DEU (27.5) AUT (4.9) POL (4.5) DEU (24.0) FRA (5.2) POL (5.1) 
Denmark DEU (10.9) SWE (10.2) GBR (9.0) DEU (9.4) GBR (7.4) SWE (6.9) 
Estonia FIN (11.2) DEU (7.9) SWE (7.8) FIN (9.9) SWE (9.1) DEU (5.5) 
Finland DEU (11.7) GBR (9.2) SWE (7.7) DEU (9.3) SWE (6.3) GBR (4.9) 
France DEU (12.2) ESP (9.9) ITA (8.3) DEU (10.5) GBR (8.4) ESP (6.8) 
Germany FRA (10.6) GBR (7.2) ITA (6.3) FRA (7.8) GBR (6.2) ITA (5.2) 
Greece DEU (7.6) GBR (5.5) ITA (4.1) ITA (3.8) DEU (3.7) GBR (3.2) 
Hungary DEU (23.6) AUT (5.9) ITA (5.1) DEU (20.4) ITA (6.3) AUT (4.7) 
Ireland GBR (15.2) DEU (7.3) FRA (6.2) GBR (10.7) DEU (5.0) ITA (3.4) 
Italy FRA (11.7) DEU (11.6) GBR (7.1) DEU (11.7) FRA (11.2) GBR (5.9) 
Latvia GBR (12.2) DEU (10.1) SWE (4.5) DEU (6.7) GBR (5.8) SWE (4.5) 
Lithuania DEU (8.2) POL (4.4) FRA (4.1) DEU (7.5) POL (4.0) FRA (3.5) 
Luxembourg DEU (9.1) FRA (7.3) ITA (5.5) DEU (10.6) FRA (5.9) BEL (4.5) 
Malta ITA (13.6) DEU (10.9) GBR (8.9) GBR (12.0) ITA (8.1) SWE (5.0) 
Netherlands DEU (19.0) FRA (8.4) BEL (7.4) DEU (20.9) FRA (7.8) GBR (7.2) 
Poland DEU (25.3) FRA (5.3) GBR (5.0) DEU (21.0) FRA (5.7) GBR (5.4) 
Portugal ESP (17.7) FRA (10,0) DEU (9.1) ESP (11.5) FRA (7.6) DEU (5.9) 
Romania ITA (9.5) DEU (7.9) FRA (3.9) DEU (13.7) ITA (6.9) FRA (6.3) 
Slovak Republic DEU (20.8) CZE (9.8) AUT (6.3) DEU (17.6) CZE (7.5) GBR (6.6) 
Slovenia DEU (19.8) ITA (12.6) HRV (6.7) DEU (15.3) ITA (9.9) AUT (7.1) 
Spain FRA (12.7) DEU (10.4) GBR (9.3) FRA (11.7) DEU (7.7) ITA (5.1) 
Sweden DEU (9.7) GBR (7.5) DNK (6.4) DEU (8.5) DNK (5.3) GBR (5.1) 
United Kingdom DEU (9.4) FRA (7.8) ESP (4.6) FRA (7.0) DEU (6.9) IRL (3.7) 
 
The next feature of the European production network that we are interested in is whether it has 
become “denser” over time. The literature defines density as the fraction of potential links that are 
present in a network.
12
 Adapted to the input-output context, we define density as the share of 
intermediate exports of value added that is supplied directly to the ultimate user, 
 
(12)     𝒗𝒂𝒙_𝒅𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕_𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒋 = [𝑣 ∙ {𝑨𝒋𝑓}]  ∙/ [𝑣 ∙ {[𝑰 − 𝑨]
−𝟏𝑨𝒋𝑓}], 
weighted over all member states. (The other part is supplied through the hubs in the global input-
output system). Results are plotted in Figure 9, which shows that density has increased from 55.9 to 
62.8 percent between 2000 and 2014. In other words, the direct supply of inputs between the member 
states has, on average, increased from 55.9 to 62.8 percent over this period, whereas the indirect 
supply through hubs (including outside hubs) has decreased from 44.1 to 37.2 percent. The production 
network has in this sense become denser between 2000 and 2014, with more direct supply links 
between the member states.  
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 See Newman (2010), chapter 6. 
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Finally, we are interested in the location of the centre of the European production network. The centre 
is calculated by weighing the midway position of all supply links with the flows of intermediate 
inputs, measured in value added.
13
 It turns out that the centre has moved between 2000 and 2014 from 
Münchwald in Germany, located 88 kilometres west of Frankfurt, to Maintal-Dörningheim, located 14 
kilometres east of Frankfurt. This can be explained by the integration of the new member states in the 
production network. 
6. Wage convergence between member states  
In the final section of the paper we will test whether wages are converging at the sector level, and 
whether the rate of convergence increases with backward and forward integration of the member states 
into the European production network (as well as into global value chains). Our hypothesis is that 
trade in inputs facilitates the diffusion of technology, allowing lagging countries to catch up with 
leading countries. This idea is central in the GVC literature. Humphrey and Schmitz (2000) argue, 
based on empirical research, that local producers learn a great deal from outside buyers about how to 
improve the production processes, attain consistent and high quality, and increase the speed of 
response to changes in demand conditions. Piermartini and Rubínová (2014) argue that supply-chain 
trade is particularly conducive to knowledge diffusion compared to trade in final products since buyers 
of inputs need to ensure the quality and compatibility of all parts and components. An example is 
provided by Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2015): “When Toyota makes car parts in Thailand, they do 
not rely on local know-how; they bring Toyota technology, Toyota management, Toyota logistics and 
any other bits of know-how needed since the Thai-made parts have to ﬁt seamlessly into the 
company’s production network”.  
The wage rate is calculated from the Social Economic Accounts annexed to WIOD,
14
 which 
include data on the total labour compensation and hours of work for each sector and country in the 
database. We adopt the 𝛽-convergence model of Baumol (1986), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), 
Mankiw et.al. (1992) and, with applications to international trade, Ben-David (1993). The model is 
based on the transition dynamics of the neoclassical growth model of Solow (1956), which predicts 
convergence in per capita income among countries that share the same basic conditions for growth. 
                                                     
13
 The midway position should preferably be calculated on the basis of the midway position of the supply links between the 
countries´ economic centres, but a lack of data forces us to use the links between the capitals instead.  
14
 Gouma et.al. (2018). 
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Figure 9. Density of the EU production network 
Direct exports of inputs between member states, percent 
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Countries that are very different from each other may not converge because of persistent differences in 
the returns to investment (in favour of the country with better institutions and policies for growth). The 
Solow model is an aggregate model, but the same kind of transition dynamics can be expected at the 
sector level in an economic union where capital, labour and technology can flow freely.  
Let us first plot the data to see if we can detect any 𝛽-convergence. All sectors in WIOD are 
included except for public, local and household services (heading O to U of ISIC, Rev 4).
15
 The latter 
are dropped since they are either non-market activities or are oriented to the local market. We use a 
scatter plot with the initial hourly wage rates in 2000 on the horizontal axis, using a logarithmic scale 
as in the theoretical model, and the percentage change between 2000 and 2014 on the vertical axis. 
The result is plotted in Figure 10. Fifteen outliers with more than 1 000 percent change in the wage 
rate (from extremely low initial wages of less than 0.5 USD per hour) have been excluded.  
The scatter plot suggests that wages are indeed converging as countries with lower initial wages 
tend to have higher wage increases. The dotted line in the plot shows the log-linear trend, but the 
actual relationship seems to be non-linear (which is the actual shape of the transition path in the Solow 
model) with proportionally faster wage growth for countries with relatively low initial wages.  
 
 
 
Let us next test if what we see can be confirmed by regressions. We specify the regression model in 
the classical way pioneered by Baumol (1986), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Mankiw, Romer 
and Weil (1992), 
 
(13)   ln (
𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1
) = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑙𝑛(𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜔𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  , 
where 𝑙𝑛(𝑤𝑖,𝑡 𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ) is the wage increase between period t-1 and t, 𝑙𝑛(𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1) is the logarithm of the 
wage rate in period t-1, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 a vector of control variables, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 an error term (assumed to be 
independent and identically distributed). The control vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑡  includes the forward and backward 
                                                     
15
 The excluded sectors are: (O84) Public administration and defence; compulsory social security, (P85) Education; (Q) 
Human health and social work activities; (R-S) Other service activities; (T) Activities of households as employers; and 
(U) Activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies. 
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integration indices derived in Section 4 plus the size of the economy measured by ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡). The 
latter is included to control for the negative correlation observed between the size of the economy and 
the integration into regional and global value chains. All sectors are included in the regressions except 
public, local and household services in section O-U of ISIC Rev 4. To control for systematic 
differences across sectors, we adopt a fixed effect model by sector-and-year, with a total of 700 panels 
(50 sectors times 14 years). The regression results are presented in Table 8. 
Table 8. Wage convergence  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      ln[lagged wage rate] -0.038*** -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.048*** -0.047*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
      Backward integration EU  0.082***  0.078***  
  (0.023)  (0.025)  
      Forward integration EU  0.045***  0.029  
  (0.017)  (0.018)  
      ln[GDP]  0.007*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
      Backward integration non-EU   0.058* 0.026  
   (0.030) (0.033)  
      Forward integration non-EU   0.087*** 0.076***  
   (0.020) (0.021)  
      Backward integration World     0.050*** 
     (0.015) 
      Forward integration World     0.051*** 
     (0.012) 
      Observations 19 530 19 530 19 530 19 530 19 530 
Panels (sector-year) 700 700 700 700 700 
R2, within 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
*, **, *** indicate the significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.  
 
The negative sign on the 𝛽-coefficient (the coefficient on the logarithm of the lagged wage rate) 
suggests that wages at the sector level are converging over time in the sense that member states with 
lower initial wages tend to enjoy faster wage growth rates. The forward and backward integration 
indices introduced in specification (2) to (5) are positive, but not always individually significant. The 
EU integration indices are both significant when they are entered alone in specification (2); as are the 
non-EU indices when they are entered alone in specification (3). However, when both EU and non-EU 
indices are included in specification (4), Backward EU and Forward non-EU are significant but not 
Forward EU and Backward non-EU. And when the indices are aggregated into a Backward World and 
Forward World in specification (5), both indices are significant and also of the same size.  
We can therefore conclude that backward and forward integration into global and regional value 
chains is associated with larger wage increases for countries with low initial wages, but it is not always 
possible to distinguish the exact contribution of each of the four dimensions of integration (forward 
EU, backward EU, forward non-EU and backward non-EU). It should be noted that this does not 
necessarily mean that wages are converging overall in the European Union. That will depend on 
whether integration is general or concentrated to a group of countries. There is a possibility that 
integration is stronger among high-wage than low–wage countries. If so, wages may not converge but 
instead diverge. Furthermore, equation (13) is a conditional wage convergence model – conditional on 
the backward and forward integration of the member states relative to the size of the economy. The 
regression results suggest that wages will converge over time if all member states achieve the same 
Håkan Nordström and Harry Flam 
26 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
level of integration over time for their respective size of the economy. However, if that is not the case 
wages may not converge fully.  
7. Summary 
Both the creation of the Single Market and the monetary union were designed to enhance integration 
and thereby promote more efficient use of resources and economic welfare, but their effects on 
integration has received relatively little attention by empirical research. Our paper uses tools from the 
global value chain, social network and wage convergence literatures to study integration of production 
in the European Union and how it has evolved over time. It makes both methodological and 
substantive contributions to the literature on European integration. 
We find that integration of a member state is positively related to the size of the economy and the 
number of years it has been a member of the European Union. Although integration between member 
states increased substantially between 2000 and 2014 in terms of trade in intermediate inputs, this did 
not come at the expense of integration with non-members. On the contrary, integration with the rest of 
world increased more than integration between member states.  
We also study the division of labour in the European Union. The new member states are suppliers 
of primary and manufactured inputs, except for Cyprus and Malta, which are exporters of services. 
The old member states increasingly export services instead of manufacturing inputs.  
The geographical structure of the European production network can be described as consisting of hubs 
and spokes. Germany is the central and most important hub, while France, Italy and United Kingdom 
play less important roles as hubs. The centre of gravity of the production network has moved 
eastwards between 2000 and 2014, as could be expected following the accession of several Central 
and East European countries.  
As a test of increasing integration, we analyse wage convergence across member states by 
regressing wage increases on measures of forward and backward production linkages both with other 
member states and with non-members. We find that wages increase faster for countries with low initial 
wages, which suggests that wages converge more rapidly as a result of integration.  
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